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 Vehicular Cloud Networks (VCN) is the network that ensures mobility and 
availability of resources allowing new services and applications like Network 
as a Service (NaaS), STorage as a Service (STaaS), Computation as a Service 
(CompaaS) and Cooperation as a Service (CaaS). In this paper, we propose a 
solution to secure the Vehicular Cloud Network (VCN). Our challenge in this 
work is to adapt the PKI architecture, which is mainly used in wired 
networks to be used in VCN. To propose a security solution for Vehicular 
Cloud Networks (VCN), our work is based on three steps; the first one is to 
make network architecture study, where we tried to highlight the main 
network components. The second step is to propose the security solution 
architecture. Finally, the last step is to program a test and validate the 
solution using a simulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern networks are developed along two axes. The first one is mobility, this is to ensure the 
network availability to the connected entities in motion. Under this axis, we can find different types of 
networks such as MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), VANET (Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork) and WSN 
(Wireless Sensor Network). The second axis is the resources availability in types (computing, storage, 
software) and volume. The most used networks are parallel computing, grid computing and cloud computing.  
Vehicular Cloud Network (VCN) is the network that ensures the mobility and availability of 
resources allowing new services and applications, like Network as a Service (NaaS), STorage as a Service 
(STaaS), Computation as a Service (CompaaS) and Cooperation as a Service (CaaS). The VCN are the result 
of merging of two main networks, the VANET and Cloud networks. So, its architecture contains both the 
cloud computing and VANET entities.  
Security in VCN is a big challenge, where security requirements must be guaranteed. The most 
important security requirements are authentication, integrity, privacy, confidentiality and traceability.  
In literature, the solution that satisfies these requirements for wired networks is the PKI (Public Key 
Infrastructure) enhanced with security mechanisms to ensure privacy. For this reason, our solution called 
VCPKI (Vehicular Cloud Public Key Infrastructure) is based on PKI, and as it is proven in section 7 our 
solution secures the network with a negligible impact on network performance. The rest of this paper is 
organized as fallows. We present networks architecture in section 2, followed by the security requirement for 
the VCN in Section 3. We describe the architecture of security solution in Section 4. The Section 5 presents 
how the solution works under VCPKI protocol. The solution analysis (security and performance analysis) is 
presented in Sections 6 and VII. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 8. 
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2. NETWORKS ARCHITECTURE 
In the following we present the architecture of VANET, Cloud Computing, also the VCN taxonomy 
and architecture. After studying the VANET [1] and Cloud Computing networks [2, 3], the Figure 1 defines 
the Vehicular Cloud Network architecture. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  VCN Architecture 
 
 
The end user is the vehicle, the RSU is the gateway to achieve the cloud part. In the cloud we find 
the Cloud Provider and Cloud Servers. Vehicular cloud is divided into three major architectures namely 
Vehicular Clouds (VC), Vehicles using Clouds (VuC), and Hybrid Clouds (HC). The Vehicular Clouds (VC) 
is a network formed only by vehicles and regarding the vehicle as shown in Figure 2(a).  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 2. Vehicular Cloud Network (VCN) 
 
 
Also, the VCN can be formed Vehicles and these vehicles are connected to the traditional clouds 
where cloud services are available as shown in Figure 2(b). The third case is called Hybrid Cloud as shown in 
Figure 2(c), where vehicular clouds will interact with the traditional cloud for services exchange.  
The vehicles and RSUs will serve as gateways on the VANET part thereby communicating with the gateways 
of traditional clouds. 
 
 
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
The most important security requirements in the Vehicular Cloud Network are authentication, 
integrity, privacy, confidentiality and traceability. 
- The authentication ensures that the message is generated by the legitimate user. It protects the elements of 
communication (messages and entities) [4, 5]. 
- In our context (Vehicular Cloud Network), the authentication is very important security requirement, 
because it is frequently solicited, to use cloud services [6]. So, our solution provides privacy-preserving 
authentication. 
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- The integrity ensures that the data is protected from deletion, modification, and production without 
permission [7]. The proposed solution should guarantee the integrity. 
- The Privacy is necessary to protect the profile and driver’s information and the vehicle localization 
against unauthorized access [8]. The privacy protection mechanisms are embedded in our security 
solution.  
- The aim of confidentiality is to protect the communication of a set of vehicles from an external intruder. 
The encryption is the main tool to ensure this security requirement and the encryption mechanisms are 
defined to be sure that the encrypted information is decrypted only by the group of members  
(vehicles) [6] ECC. 
- The traceability identifies vehicles and their communications and preserves their privacy and information 
confidentiality [9]. To protect user information, the identity must be hidden and also it is important to use 
a system component (trace manager) to obtain the real identity where it is needed [10]. 
 
 
4. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURING  VEHICULAR CLOUD WITH PKI (VCPKI) 
4.1. Proposed model for VCPKI 
The VCN is composed of three layers   
- The network layer (VANET)  
- Mobile infrastructure layer 
- Cloud computing layer 
The Figure 3 shows our proposed model for Secured VCN and its components. The goal of the VCN 
security architecture is to be in harmony with three main architectures (VANET, Cloud, PKI). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Proposed Model for Secured VCN 
 
 
4.2.    Components 
4.2.1. RCA (Root Certificate Authority)       
The RCA is the trust anchor in the system where the trust is assumed and not derived, its certificate 
is self-signed. Its main role is to issue and sign certificate only for subordinate authorities of the VCPKI 
security system (LTCA, VCSP). 
 
4.2.2. LTCA (Long-Term Certificate Authority) 
LTCA issue and sign long-term certificate for the system end users (Vehicles). Each entity must 
send its request directly to LTCA to obtain a long-term certificate. Also, the LTCA is responsible to issue 
tokens for vehicles (or other entities), these tokens are used to request pseudonyms (short-term certificate) 
from the PCA. 
 
4.2.3. CLA (Cloud Authority) 
The CLA is responsible of managing users cloud accounts, and to issue tokens for vehicles (or other 
entities), these tokens are used to request cloud service from the VCSP. 
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4.2.4. VCSP (Vehicular Cloud Service Provider) 
It makes the cloud service available to the connected vehicles. For this, it acquires and manages the 
computing infrastructure’s information. In Vehicular Cloud, there are two types of resources, the Vehicles 
resources (OBU), and computers resources (Datacenter). 
 
4.2.5. PCA (Pseudonym Certificate Authority) 
The use of pseudonyms is important to protect the privacy of users in the network. This authority 
has two main roles: 
- Issuing pseudonyms (short-term certificate): Each vehicle sends a request to the closest PCA to achieve a 
set of pseudonymous certificates. Using pseudonyms, each vehicle can communicate in the network 
anonymously. 
- Pseudonym resolution: The PCA is endowed with the function of resolving pseudonyms identity. This 
operation is used when it is necessary, it consists of finding out the related token to a specific pseudonym, 
after that it queries the LTCA to identify and reveal the real identity for that token. If the pseudonym is 
identified as malicious, the PCA can revoke all related pseudonyms. 
 
4.2.6. VC-RSU (Local Vehicular Cloud Service Provider) 
It is an RSU as used in VANET equipped with the computational unit used to offer more 
functionalities and services for vehicles. So the VC-RSU ensure two main functions, the first is the RSU 
managing the VANET, the second is cloud management function. As the first function is known and already 
used in VANET, the second one consists of offering local cloud services for vehicles, without requesting the 
service from VCSP. 
 
4.3. Proposed Model Architecture 
The proposed architecture can be divided into four Layers. 
 
4.3.1. The end users Layer 
This layer contains the vehicles connected to the closest VC-RSU. 
 
4.3.2. Gateway layer 
This layer can be compounded by a set of VC-RSU and another network component (ex: routers) 
that allows the direct access to the other system components.  
 
4.3.3. Service Layer 
In this layer, we find the components that allow the services: privacy (PCA) and the Cloud  
Service (VCSP). 
 
4.3.4. Authorities  
Three elements are the essential components in this layer: The RCA (issue the certificate for this 
layer components), the LTCA and CLA. 
 
4.4. Functional View 
In this section, we present functions or services, this architecture allows two main services: security 
and cloud.  
 
4.4.1. Security service: 
This service regroups all security operations in the network with security entities (LTCA, PCA). 
These operations concern LTCs and pseudonyms. 
 
4.4.2. Cloud Service 
This service concerns the cloud authorities (CLA, VCSP) and the performed operations to obtain a 
cloud service. This service is directly relied with the security service because we want to offer a cloud service 
in a secured context. 
 
 
5.    VCPKI DESIGN 
5.1.    Security Service 
5.1.1. Request Long-Term Certificate: 
1: The vehicle request from RSU’s authority’s certificate. 
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2: The RSU sends the certificate to the vehicles. 
3: The vehicle generates Elliptic Curve Public Key Pair.  
4: The vehicle creates a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), encrypted by the public key of the LTCA. 
5: The vehicle sends it online to LTCA.  
6: LTCA issues new LTC.  
7: LTCA load its private key, signs LTC, and create a certificate. 
8: LTCA sends it back to the subscriber. 
 
5.1.2. Request a Pseudonym Certificate: 
To enforce the privacy in this protocol, we divide the operation of requesting pseudonym into  
two steps. The first one is token request where the user can use his real identity (Long Term Certificate) from 
LTCA. Using this token, the user can request a pseudonym from the PCA (step 2). The Figure 4 show us an 
Overview on message exchange. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Request Pseudonym Certificate 
 
 
a. Obtain Security Token 
1: Prepare Token Request 
2: Send the token request to the LTCA 
3: Token generation 
4: Token replay 
5: Store the token in HSM to be used in the next phase. 
b. Obtain Pseudonym Certificate 
The pseudonym certificate request is between the PCA (Pseudonym Authority) and the vehicle 
where this later use the token obtained from the step before. 
1:  The Vehicle prepares the Pseudonym Request. 
2:  The vehicle sends the Pseudonym Request to the PCA, in this request the security token is sent as a 
parameter. 
3:  The PCA verifies the request and the token, and generates a set of pseudonyms. 
4:  The PCA sends the generated pseudonyms to the Vehicle. 
 
5.1.3. Pseudonym Resolution 
Pseudonym resolution is a process used to identify the real identity of a pseudonym. This process is 
requested by the police, and it is done in two phases Token Resolution, identity resolution as shown  
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Pseudonym Resolution  
 
 
a. Step 1: Token Resolution 
1. The authority gets the malicious node’s pseudonym from the network and prepares the 
TokenResolutionRequest. 
2. The authority sends TokenResolutionRequest to the PCA, where the pseudonym of the malicious node is 
sent as a parameter. 
3. The PCA finds the corresponding token for the pseudonym. 
4. The PCA send the token to the authority by the TokenResolutionReplay. 
b. Step 2: Identity Resolution 
1. The authority prepares the IdentityResolutionRequest. 
2. The authority sends IdentityResolutionRequest to the LTCA. 
3. The LTCA finds the corresponding identity to the token prepare the reply message. 
4. The LTCA sends the IdentityResolutionReplay where the operation result is sent. 
 
 
6. SECURED CLOUD SERVICE 
The cloud service allows the user to access to the cloud, our proposition ensures more security  
and privacy. Figure 6 gives an overview of the message exchange. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Secured Cloud Service 
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6.1.    Request the cloud service 
6.1.1. Step 1: Cloud Token Request 
a. The vehicle prepares Cloud Token (request a pseudonym if it didn’t before) 
b. The vehicle sends the CloudTokenRequest to the CLA where the cloud account ID and the pseudonym 
are sent as parameters (the communication is performed in a secured channel) 
c. The Cloud Authority (CLA) verify the cloud account ID and prepare a token for the user cloud account. 
d. The Cloud Authority (CLA) send back the CloudTokenRepley that contain the Cloud Token. 
 
6.1.2. Step 2: Cloud Service Request 
a. The vehicle sends a CloudServiceRequest to the VCSP using the cloud token. 
b. The VCSP sends a CloudAccountStatusReq to the CLA that includes the token. 
c. The CLA replies with CloudAccountStatusRep containing the cloud account information. 
d. The VCSP stores the cloud account status with the corresponding pseudonym to offer the appropriate 
cloud service. 
e. The VCSP sends the CloudServiceReplay, if the service is grant, the vehicle can use his pseudonym to 
use its cloud service. 
 
6.2. Renewing the cloud service request 
As it is presented above, the vehicle requests a Cloud Service using its pseudonym, where the 
pseudonyms are valid for a period and the vehicle can use another the pseudonym, for that the validity of the 
cloud service is related to the validity of the pseudonym. So, for each pseudonym changing, the vehicle must 
update the cloud service request. The updating request contains the old pseudonym, the new pseudonym, and 
the cloud service token. 
 
 
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The security analysis is based on how the solution ensures the VCN security requirements  
(Integrity, Privacy and Non-repudiation). 
 
7.1. Integrity 
Our system is a PKI based solution, so the exchanged messages must contain a valid sender 
signature, which is easily verifiable through the certificate authorities (LTCA, PCA). Therefore, the integrity 
in our system is a guarantee. 
 
7.2.  Privacy 
The pseudonym is a temporary certificate, characterized by the anonymity and a short period of 
validity. This pseudonym is used instead of the digital certificate to provide the privacy. Pseudonyms 
guarantee the privacy in using the network, in VCN, the challenge is to guarantee the privacy in using 
network and cloud service. For this our proposition based on the authority’s separation to enforce the privacy 
in the network and between authorities when using cloud service.  
 
7.3. Non-Repudiation  
In VCN and during emergency situations as accidents, actions or changes must be associated with a 
unique vehicle (driver). Also, the cloud services are offered for multiple tenants; non-repudiation is important 
to identify the tenant participation in any argued transaction. In VCPKI protocol, pseudonyms are used to 
exchange messages. The message originator only knows this pseudonym and therefore, the sender cannot 
repudiate. 
 
 
8. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
To evaluate the impact of our solution on the network performance, we have implemented our 
system VCPKI (Vehicular Cloud PKI) on OMNET ++ 5.0 simulator [11] with veins 4.4 [12] and SUMO-
0.25.0 simulator [13]. In Table 1, we present the simulation parameters  In this simulation, we have measured 
the delay in two situations, the first one without using VCPKI protocol, the second one the network use 
VCPKI as a security protocol. As seen in Figure 7, the difference is negligible, it is between 2,1.10-5s and 
7,73.10-5s. Also, we have measured the packet delivery ratio (PDR), as shown in Figure 8, and it is the same 
for the two situations (with, without VCPKI). So, the protocol VCPKI have no impact on PDR in 
the network. 
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Table 1. Simulation parameters 
Item Value 
Map of Tlemcen (Algeria) 2,5km*2,5km 
Simulation time 1000s 
Speed max 14m/s 
Packet size 1024 bytes 
Bit rate 6 Mps 
Number of RSU 4 
Communication Rage of vehicle 800m 
Communication Rage of RSU 800m 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Delay in VCN 
 
 
Figure 8.  VCPKI impact on PDR in VCN 
 
 
9. CONCLUSION  
In this work, we have made a tour on security in Vehicular Cloud Networks; we studied attacks and 
their impact on the network aspects (Cloud service and security requirement). This study helps us two define 
the most touched security requirements by the attacks. On the base on this study, we have proposed VCPKI 
as a protocol to secure the network. After the implementation and the simulation of the VCPKI protocol, we 
conclude that the solution enforces the security of the network with a negligible impact on the network 
performance. 
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